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3 Shifting media and the failure 
of political communication in 
Russia
Samuel A. Greene
One of the key puzzles in contemporary Russian history is the failure of civil 
society to mobilise around what would appear to be massive common grievances. 
There are, undoubtedly, numerous causes for this, among which may be such 
widely reported phenomena as low social capital and a deeply ingrained mistrust 
of collective action. Basic political theory, however, suggests another factor that 
may be important in the reticence of Russians to prevent the return to authoritari-
anism so widely trumpeted in international headlines: the media. Thus, in 1772, 
David Hume wrote:
It is apprehended, that arbitrary power would steal in upon us, were we not 
careful to prevent its progress, and were there not an easy method of convey-
ing the alarm from one end of the kingdom to another. The spirit of the people 
must be frequently rouzed, in order to curb the ambition of the court; and 
the dread of rouzing this spirit must be employed to prevent that ambition. 
Nothing so effectual to this purpose as the liberty of the press, by which all 
the learning, wit and genius of the nation may be employed on the side of 
freedom, and everyone be animated to its defence. (Hume [1772] 1994: 3)
Some seventy years later, Alexis de Tocqueville echoed the thought: ‘Nothing but 
a newspaper can drop the same thought into a thousand minds at the same mo-
ment’ ([1840] 1994: 111).
The prevailing view of the media in Russia – at least as far as political commu-
nication is concerned – is highly pessimistic. President Vladimir Putin is seen to 
have imposed a ‘neo-authoritarian media system’, in which direct or indirect state 
control is stifling free expression (see, for example: Becker 2004). Certainly, this 
is true: by no means can Russian media be considered free, and the state’s role in 
the sector is nothing short of pernicious. But that is only part of the story and does 
not explain why, even in the freest sectors of the Russian media and even prior to 
the re-imposition of repression, the Russian media have since 1991 consistently 
failed to play the aggregating and galvanising role described by Hume and de 
Tocqueville.
Unfortunately, contemporary research on Russian media, while thorough and 
informative, has fallen somewhat behind the field. The problem, this chapter ar-
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gues, is that it is insufficient to treat the Russian media solely as a dependent 
variable, afflicted and distorted by various exogenous factors. A recent trend in 
the study of media and communications has begun, in its proponents’ words, to 
‘bring the sociology of the media back in’, challenging researchers ‘to bring . . . 
sophisticated analysis to bear on understanding media as an independent variable, 
as part of the process of political meaning making rather than just a convenient 
indicator of the outcome’ (Benson 2004: 276).
Marshall McLuhan famously wrote that, for those interested in understanding 
the link between the media and social change, ‘the medium is the message’. He 
explained:
This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any me-
dium – that is, of any extension of ourselves – result from the new scale that 
is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new 
technology. (McLuhan 1994: 7)
The importance of media, in other words, lies in the relationships and modes of 
interaction that they foster. And if this is true, then the significance of both content 
and technology are best evaluated through the prism of the social processes they 
engender. Thus, Sonia Livingstone differentiates between ‘socially new’ and ‘so-
cially old’ media, writing that we recognise true novelty when ‘a key consequence 
of new media technologies is the transformation of the audience itself’ (Living-
stone 1999: 64). To this, Terhi Rantanen (2002) adds the logical element of scale, 
although this should not be taken to imply that bigger is necessarily better.
Seen from this angle, the equation that links the media to civil society becomes 
less abstract. By placing the media at the centre of the analysis, we no longer 
assume an organic, if somewhat mystical, relationship, in which free media and 
democracy go hand in hand so long as the state and other villains stay out of the 
way. Instead, we can get a clearer view of how the interplay of the various ac-
tors that inhabit the media space either encourages or inhibits fortuitous develop-
ments. This article approaches this task by means of a simple comparison. Taking 
as subjects the freest media sectors in the pre-1991 Soviet Union and post-1991 
Russia – samizdat and regional independent newspapers, respectively – it asks 
why the former appears to have been so much more successful than the latter in 
galvanising civil society. The answer, I will argue, lies in the specific workings of 
the media themselves. While samizdat was inherently and inextricably tied to the 
Soviet dissident movement, even those Russian newspapers that are potentially 
most virtuous are governed by internal logics that militate against the develop-
ment of a true fourth estate.
Samizdat and independent Soviet political discourse
Any discussion of the meaning and significance of samizdat must begin by defin-
ing the term. The word itself – which is an abbreviation for ‘self-publishing’ – is 
somewhat misleading, especially in an era of desktop publishing, the Internet and 
photocopiers. It is not enough simply to note that samizdat is independent (of the 
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state) and (usually) non-commercial. Samizdat is a social phenomenon, a very 
specific and highly participatory mode of multilateral communication, in which 
the act of participation is more important than what is actually being communi-
cated.
Aleksandr Daniel’, a former participant in samizdat and currently a researcher 
on Soviet dissent, defines samizdat as ‘that specific method for disseminating so-
cially significant, uncensored texts, in which the multiplication and distribution of 
texts takes place outside the purview of the author, within the readership’; in this 
context, ‘the publisher and the reader are one and the same’ (Daniel’ 2003). In the 
classic samizdat process, readers re-published and distributed whatever texts they 
found interesting, usually by making carbon copies on onion-skin paper with a 
typewriter. For the most part, samizdat was a grass roots, de-centralised and non-
organised initiative. Individuals produced what they wanted to read and passed it 
to close friends, who then reproduced it and passed it to others.
That definition of process suggests the second crucial factor – that of motiva-
tion. Samizdat was literally created by those who demanded it, and the demand 
was for literature that could not be obtained in any other way. According to Liud-
mila Alekseeva,
samizdat was created by a combination of factors. On the one hand, society’s 
recognition that much is hidden from it and that it is lied to. Second, the 
maintenance of censorship, which shows society that it is being lied to, that 
the truth is being hidden from it, and that it does not have the ability to use a 
printing press to say what it wants to say. And third, the availability of type-
writers. (Alekseeva 2003)
Censorship, of course, is also a social phenomenon, going well beyond the 
simple regulatory prohibition of published dissent. As Jan Plamper notes (2001), 
censorship in the Soviet Union was in large part aimed at the abolition of ambigu-
ity, banning symbolic and suggestive approaches to literature – regardless of con-
tent – in favour of a realist doctrine inherently devoid of connotation. Alekseeva 
states that ‘it was impossible to express almost any human emotion with such 
censorship. Eventually it just became ridiculous: you couldn’t even get the poetry 
of Okudzhava and Vysotskii. They weren’t printed, even though they weren’t the 
least bit anti-Soviet’ (Alekseeva 2003).
Thus, samizdat began as a means of publishing literature (primarily poetry) 
that people wanted to read but that was not published by the state. This trend 
began with poets from Russia’s Silver Age, and then moved into work from more 
contemporary poets (Sadomskaia 2003). The 1960s saw the introduction of more 
prose, including translations of contemporary Western classics, and the work of 
Russian writers (Daniel’ 2003). Crucially, poets and writers began to see samizdat 
not as a last recourse after being rejected by the official press, but as the medium 
of choice.
Simultaneously, the content of samizdat began to change. The politicisation 
of the content of samizdat – as opposed to the form, which was inherently politi-
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Figure 3.1 Liudmila Alekseeva, the chairman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, at a meeting 
with human rights defenders and representatives of the press in memory of the journalist 
Anna Politkovskaia, 30 August 2007. Photo by Kirill Tulin, courtesy of Kommersant Photo 
Archive. 
cised – began in 1956, with the clandestine distribution of Khrushchev’s ‘secret 
speech’, detailing some of the atrocities of Stalin’s terrors.
Alongside the Khrushchev report, samizdat distributed reports from Poland, 
Hungary and Yugoslavia, including Yugoslav newspaper reports on the events in 
Hungary in 1956 (Vail’ 2003). A similar dynamic continued into the late 1960s, 
with the publication of Abel Agenbegian’s economic analysis of the socialist sys-
tem, as well as foreign materials on the events in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the 
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia became something of a turning point in the de-
velopment of samizdat: ‘After the troops went into Czechoslovakia, new protest 
letters were written immediately and were distributed immediately. After that, 
any time something major happened, for example, if someone was sentenced, the 
reaction in samizdat was always very quick’ (Vol’pina 2003).
It is important to challenge a piece of inherited wisdom on samizdat, namely 
Feldbrugge’s assertion that, because samizdat was usually published anonymous-
ly, it lacked the solidaristic relationship between reader and writer that we expect 
to arise at a western newspaper, whose readers see by-lines and may know the 
address of the newsroom (Feldbrugge 1975: 19). This is, first and foremost, not 
true. Issues of Khronika, for example, usually contained a note asking readers to 
pass information for or about the publication up the distribution chain, where it 
would eventually reach the writer and/or editor (Daniel’ 2003).
More fundamentally, however, such an assertion fails to get at the heart of the 
most basic distinction between a traditional publication and samizdat. The ‘sam’ 
in samizdat (‘self’ in self-publishing) does not refer to the ability of the writer to 
publish what he or she wants to write; rather, it refers to the ability of the reader to 
publish what he or she wants to read. Thus, the success in terms of circulation of 
any particular samizdat publication depends entirely and exclusively on readers’ 
interest. No other modern media system can make that claim.
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Those authors who did publish their addresses and/or telephone numbers, 
meanwhile, found that readers responded in much the same way as they do to 
community newspapers in different contexts. This dynamic clearly raised the po-
tential authority and social significance of samizdat well beyond that attainable 
by the official press and thus presented a threat to the regime. As Daniel’ notes, 
‘samizdat activity was seen as oppositional if not by the authorities themselves, 
then by the system of prohibitions that they spawned’ (Daniel’ 2003).
The Brezhnev regime’s broad acquiescence to the reality of samizdat – leaving 
the bulk of it alone, while going after those who most directly challenged the 
regime – gave way to a much less tolerant stance under Andropov. Frequent raids, 
confiscations and arrests in the early 1980s disrupted but did not stop samizdat 
activity (Daniel’ 2003; Vail’ 2003). Ironically, it was Gorbachev who brought on 
the death of samizdat. To a certain extent, this is intuitive. Asked when samizdat 
ended in the USSR, Liudmila Alekseeva replied: ‘When censorship ended’ (Ale-
kseeva 2003). That, however, hides a more important phenomenon. By allowing 
freer access to printing and distribution, glasnost meant that the writers who had 
earlier fed samizdat could become publishers as well (see, for example, Grigory-
ants 1989). Once that happened, the essence of samizdat – the unification of the 
role of reader and publisher – evaporated (Daniel’ 2003). If only by a few years, 
the Soviet Union outlived samizdat, not because of successful repression, but be-
cause the medium itself had ceased to send a message.
The old-new Russian media
Looking for free media in today’s Russia is not as thankless a task as it might 
initially seem. Any casual observer who happens to speak Russian will note the 
presence, to this day, of critical newspapers, radio stations and even television 
broadcasts. Some, such as the weekly Novaia gazeta, are outright oppositional. 
Nor does ownership appear to be an iron barrier. The radio station Ekho Moskvy, 
broadly seen as the mouthpiece of anti-Putin democrats, manages to retain edito-
rial independence despite being majority owned by Gazprom, the state-dominated 
natural gas monopoly that has, admittedly, kept NTV television on a much shorter 
leash. Even official state mouthpieces, such as Rossiiskaia gazeta and the televi-
sion channel Kul’tura, frequently carry direct criticism of the government.
The problem, however, comes when we remember that ‘the media’ is a term 
that is both plural and aggregate, referring to a space created, maintained and 
populated by numerous actors. These actors, in turn, are collectively responsible 
– and, so, individually hardly responsible at all – for the character of that space. 
Where such a space exists, the actions of individuals within it begin to carry a 
dual meaning. The first is content-specific and peculiar to the individual media 
outlet, what we might call the message. The second meaning is created by the 
broader resonance of that message through the social interactions of mediated 
communication described by McLuhan. Thus, the meaning of the publication of 
Khronika tekushchikh sobytii as an individual news outlet was amplified by the 
fact that Khronika was part of a broader media space called samizdat. In contem-
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porary Russia, though, the likes of Novaia gazeta, Ekho Moskvy and scattered 
publications and broadcasts in other outlets are not sufficient to create a ‘free 
media space’ distinct from the overall Russian media space – which is decidedly 
not free. Their message may stand out, but there is not a logic to them that would 
separate them from the rest, the way samizdat stood out against Pravda and the 
rest of the Party press.
The print media offer most scope for a ‘free media space’. Tabloids, glossy 
magazines and other entertainment-only publications can be left aside, as they do 
not carry political communication. Likewise, Rossiiskaia gazeta notwithstand-
ing, government-owned periodicals can be disregarded as structurally unlikely 
to be independent. The major Moscow-based daily newspapers, some of which 
have nationwide circulation, are freer than the central television channels but are 
generally under the thumb of one or another major political/economic sponsor 
– the most dominant of which, increasingly, is the state. All that remains are lo-
cal, privately owned general-interest newspapers. Most Russian towns of any size 
have at least one such newspaper, usually published weekly. The majority were 
founded in the early 1990s and are owned by their editors and managers, often 
a small group of friends or relatives. They are subject to the same failings as the 
rest of the Russian media, including corruption and capture by sponsors, but many 
of them are profitable to a degree that allows them to resist the more egregious 
depths of ‘selling out’ common in other sectors (Eismont and Greene 2005). And 
on the most basic level, unlike all of the other media categories mentioned above, 
there is no obvious structural factor that would preclude these newspapers from 
forming a free media space in Russia.
To select the newspapers to be studied here, I have followed Michael 
Burawoy’s method (1998, 2003) and allowed the cases to select themselves. All 
of the newspapers described below are finalists for and/or participants in the Rus-
sian Independent Print Media Program, a four-year training and technical support 
initiative financed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and implemented by the New Eurasia Foundation.1 As such, prior to being studied 
they were all assessed to meet a set of basic criteria, including that they be ‘com-
mitted to ethical principles of independent journalism, be reader-oriented and 
socially responsible, be an independent and honest business’ and not ‘controlled 
by [the] state or oligarchs, . . . mouthpieces of political parties or power groups, . . . 
[or] engaged in any kind of xenophobic propaganda’. The criteria also excluded 
niche publications and the local editions of Moscow-based or national network 
publications. All of the information presented was gathered through on-site and 
off-site interviews and direct observation, conducted between September 2004 
and September 2005. Because of potential political sensitivities, the identities of 
research subjects are withheld.
Most independent local and regional newspapers in Russia, like samizdat pub-
lications in the Soviet Union, arose because of a need perceived by their creators. 
This fact is not as banal as it might seem at first glance. The key point here is that, 
among the various motivations that drove these editors and publishers to launch 
their newspapers in the early 1990s, profit is rarely among them. That many of 
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them evolved into successful businesses is secondary; what is important is that, 
for most, the perceived need had much more to do with mediated communication 
than with the accumulation of capital.
Broadly speaking, local and regional independent newspapers in Russia can 
be divided into three categories, based on the motivational logics of their creators 
and managers. The general assertion made above is true for the first two of these 
categories: paternalistic newspapers, activist newspapers. A third category, what 
we might call profiteering newspapers, proves a partial exception. The remainder 
of this section will deal with each of these categories in detail.
Paternalistic Newspapers
Newspapers that fall into the ‘paternalistic’ category see themselves – and, in their 
view, proper journalism as a whole – as part of a tradition dating back to Herzen 
and Kolokol. In this model, the newspaper sees itself as part of the cultural and 
intellectual elite, endowed with a clear, bird’s-eye view of the community and 
charged with a civilising mission. Often, such newspapers were created because 
their founders had something to say that was not being said in other local media.
A typical example is SFD1, a weekly newspaper in a large city in Russia’s 
Southern Federal District. The city itself has a population of approximately 1 mil-
lion, with a total of 5 million in the surrounding oblast’. Describing the newspa-
per’s genesis, the executive director (and daughter of the founder and editor-in-
chief) said: ‘The newspaper was created in 1991 as a means of political activity, a 
means of self-expression, so that there would be at least some kind of opposition. 
We didn’t think about it as an enterprise that needs to bring in money.’2
Initially, that ‘self-expression’ meant providing a counterpoint to the commu-
nist-dominated leadership of the city and the region, backed up by reporting on a 
full range of issues – which is true of many other paternalistic newspapers. As a 
result, journalists at such newspapers generally feel freer than journalists at other 
types of media to delve into controversial issues and avow a range of opinions. 
Thus, one of the reporters at SFD1, who had worked earlier at other local news-
papers, said that despite uncompetitive wages, ‘I like it here because my bosses 
don’t tell me what or how to write.’ At FEFD1, a weekly newspaper in a large city 
in the Far East Federal District, a senior writer said that ‘the best thing about this 
newspaper is it’s “opposition-ness”. There are topics that no one else other than 
us in our region will ever write about.’3 At CFD2, a weekly newspaper in a mid-
sized town in the Central Federal District, the editor said that ‘we feel that we are 
special. Our journalists know that we can do things that others can’t.’4
Likewise, paternalistic newspapers generally take a strongly principled stand 
on issues of independence and objectivity. Many have adopted western-style 
codes of ethics and banned paid articles and unmarked advertising. They are also 
usually careful to avoid close contact with political interests, even when they may 
agree ideologically with those interests. In one example, the owner of VFD2, a 
small-town weekly in the Volga Federal District, was approached by the local 
leader of the Union of Right Forces, one of Russia’s two largest liberal parties, of-
fering to sponsor the newspaper financially in return for favourable coverage. The 
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owner, himself a liberal, said: ‘I told him, “If you really believe in liberal ideas, 
then you’ll understand that I cannot have anything to do with you.” ’5
Over time, however, the ‘self’ that was being expressed at SFD1 was increas-
ingly the figure of the editor and founder, a self-professed champion of the small 
farmer who was eager for the newspaper to serve a rural audience. In the editor’s 
words, ‘this is a newspaper for the villager, for a good, strong peasant family, 
with its own little plot of land. The mission is to strengthen the status of the rural 
landowner.’
Thus, a review of the archives shows that in 1995, when the newspaper had its 
peak circulation of approximately 120,000, it contained a broad mix of general-
interest materials on issues such as taxes, pensions and currency reform, as well as 
advice, popular science and so on. By 1997, the content had been heavily tailored 
down to the perceived interests of the villager, a trend that continues to the present 
day; at the time this research was conducted, the newspaper had a circulation of 
26,500.
At the newsroom’s weekly letuchka meeting, during which the staff review the 
previous issue of the paper, there was an argument about what sorts of stories the 
newspaper should cover – reportedly a recurring theme at these meetings. Some 
of the staff were upset about a large article on the Kyoto climate protocols, with 
one person complaining, ‘that’s not peasant information’. Some of the older staff 
complained about a complimentary article about on old crony of Stalin, while 
younger staff objected that ‘readers in the villages like Stalin’. One young staff 
writer said: ‘The ordinary peasant is not going to read us. Our newspaper is ori-
ented more towards the village intelligentsia. Otherwise, if we write about Stalin, 
they’ll read us; if not, they won’t.’
Privately, journalists at the newspaper – most of whom are from the city and 
have never lived in a village – concede that they feel too far divorced from the 
editor’s target audience to serve that audience well. One said that ‘our mission is 
to help and enlighten villagers. But very little of what we write is really interesting 
to peasants. I don’t think any of us really knows what the world of the peasant is 
really like.’ Tellingly, after the letuchka meeting, some of the writers made light of 
the concept of ‘the village intelligentsia’, wondering aloud whether such a group 
actually exists.
Indeed, this problem – when the audience imagined by the editorial leader and 
the really existing potential audience are often out of synch – appears to be com-
mon among paternalistic newspapers. A similar effect, though driven by a some-
what different dynamic, can be observed at FEFD1. There, in the late 1990s the 
owner-editor decided that the newspaper should serve a combination of consum-
ers and entrepreneurs, with a mission of vospitanie – a combination of upbringing 
and education, the way one raises a child – for the participants of the new market 
economy. Currently, the newspaper has a circulation of approximately 8,000, of 
whom the editor estimates some 27 per cent are entrepreneurs. That circulation is 
down from a peak of 33,000 in 1996, when the newspaper’s archives – like those 
of SFD1 – show a much broader range of topics and, in particular, considerably 
more politics. The editor, however, is firm in his belief that the new course is bet-
ter: ‘People are sick to death of politics. No one needs an exposé any more. For 
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our long-time readers, I keep some of the social themes that no one other than us 
will write about. But I’m moving in a different direction.’
As a result, rather than reflecting the whole range of interaction between jour-
nalists, sources and readers, SFD1, FEFD1 and other paternalistic newspapers 
reflect almost exclusively the insulated worldview of their editors. This view, 
moreover, places the newspaper and its producers outside of the society that con-
tains its readers, as a foreign element with a specific mission and role to play. 
Indeed, in a training seminar for newspaper editors, when asked to locate his 
newspaper on a simple scheme including ‘the state’ and ‘society’, the editor of 
VFD1, a small weekly in the Volga Federal District, chose a point equidistant 
from both; most of the other editors present agreed.6 In the best case, this removal 
filters the dialogue between media producer and media user through the ideology 
of the former. In the worst case, it makes such a dialogue impossible.
Activist Newspapers
At first glance, activist newspapers may not seem to differ greatly from their pa-
ternalistic counterparts. Like paternalistic newspapers, they are often created as 
a means of expression, driven by opposition to the prevailing political powers at 
the time the newspaper was founded. Similarly, they are also strongly beholden to 
the ideologies of their leaders. Unlike paternalistic newspapers, however, activ-
ist newspapers are generally very closely tied into their communities, which in 
turn are usually smaller than those that host paternalistic newspapers. And unlike 
paternalistic newspapers, they are frequently deeply and directly involved in local 
politics.
A typical example is FEFD3, a weekly newspaper in an economically depressed 
medium-sized city in the Far East Federal District, near the Chinese border. The 
newspaper is owned and run by five friends, all in their fifties and sixties, who 
used to work together at the local factory newspaper in Soviet days. Ironically, 
it is that Soviet heritage that informs the newspaper’s activism. According to the 
newspaper’s general manager:
Our newspaper has its own pride. We preserve the best traditions of Soviet 
journalism: social issues and social justice. Before, newspapers used to work 
on a higher level. [. . .] We all came out of Soviet journalism, and so we take 
an active civic position. Maybe that’s not so good from the point of view of 
a commercial newspaper, but I continue to believe, although I may be alone 
in this, that we need to pay a lot of attention to issues of local government, to 
budget transparency, for example. In those sorts of issues, we are the initia-
tors. We also have a humanitarian mission. We try to save people, to collect 
money for the sick. It’s a newspaper with a human face.7
On a day-to-day basis, this translates into relatively objective and high-quality 
journalism, achieved in part by giving journalists the sort of free rein also seen 
at paternalistic newspapers. Says one reporter at FEFD3: ‘The point is to help 
people make sense of what’s going on around them, but not to force your opinion 
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on them. Some newspapers can’t really achieve that. We can. No one dictates to 
us what to write, what to do.’ This is coupled with a refusal to engage in influence-
peddling. Again, the general manager said: ‘People don’t give us [money for in-
fluence], and we don’t take. All you need is to take $10,000 once, and you’re 
dependent for life. We can write about anything, and no one can tell us what to 
do. They know we would tell them to take a hike.’ The only real exception in the 
newspaper’s coverage is the issue of illegal logging. ‘We can’t go up against the 
mafia’, the general manager said.
Similar in spirit is FEFD4, also a weekly in a smaller town in the Far East 
Federal District, all of whose thirty-three coal mines are now defunct and where 
unemployment is well above 50 per cent. Published by four people – two of whom 
have other day jobs – the newspaper is known locally for standing up to the city 
administration, the only real local institution with money. ‘We didn’t set out to be 
oppositional, we just want to live in a normal city’, the editor said.8
From a business standpoint, this approach appears to be more successful than 
the paternalistic model. At FEFD3, circulation stands at 17,000 – larger than at 
most paternalistic papers in much larger cities – and is slowly growing, while cir-
culation at most of the paternalistic newspapers cited earlier is falling. FEFD3’s 
general manager said: ‘It’s something of a paradox. On the one hand, the city is 
dying. There is no future here. It should be impossible for us to be successful. 
But the newspaper is growing and growing. Even if we raise prices, people keep 
buying it, despite their miniscule purchasing power.’ FEFD4 has a circulation of 
approximately 6,000, which is significant in a town with only 3,000 telephones.
This in part lends these newspapers a degree of confidence that allows them to 
be more adventurous journalistically. FEFD3 has for much of its existence written 
critically of the local administration, which led at one point to the fire-bombing 
of the general manager’s apartment, but the newspaper has survived. These news-
papers correspondingly have relatively low turnover and display a higher level of 
dedication among their staff than do paternalistic newspapers. The owner-editor 
of FEFD4 and her teen-aged son, who is also distribution manager once he has 
completed his homework, were once driving the entire print run of an issue in 
their van back from the printing house, approximately 100 kilometres away, when 
the van’s engine caught fire. Stopped by the side of the road on the edge of the 
taiga, with no way to douse the fire, the two nonetheless made repeated trips into 
the burning van to salvage issues of the newspaper.
The positive potential of this model is illustrated in one case – that of the 
aforementioned CFD2 – in which a newspaper made the transition from the 
paternalistic model to the activist model. The newspaper, owned and run by a 
husband-and-wife team of old Soviet journalists, used to operate with much the 
same mentality of SFD1, undertaking to educate and raise its readers. Under the 
influence of a USAID-funded training programme, however, the pair began to take 
cautious steps at removing their personal opinions from articles and allowing their 
reporters to take the lead in identifying and pursuing issues. They also undertook a 
readership study and created mechanisms for readers to better communicate their 
own concerns to the newsroom. The editor said:
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The first thing that happened was that we became less ambitious. About five 
times less ambitious. We used to want to tackle everything. Now our priori-
ties are more concrete. And, in the end, our readers have surprised us. We 
used to think worse of them. We used to think of them as sort of the unshaven, 
unkempt masses.
This shift, moreover, coincided with a financial scandal involving the local 
government, a Moscow investment bank and a mining company, a topic the news-
paper would have previously ignored as too sophisticated for its readers. Instead, it 
investigated and produced a series of articles that had national resonance but also 
won the admiration of readers. Over the course of the scandal, the newspaper’s 
circulation rose to 20,000, in a town of 96,000. The editor credits that success with 
preventing the local government from shutting the newspaper down:
When we were taken to court, I was surprised to see regular people in the 
courtroom. They were our readers. When I asked them why they came, they 
said it was to make sure that nothing happened to their newspaper. I think the 
authorities notice something like that. A lot of the voters in our city are our 
readers.
But this sort of activism also leads to a direct involvement in politics. The general 
manager of FEFD3 relates:
We once took the tax authorities to court, just out of principle. We wanted 
to put them in their place. And there was one local businessman, very smart, 
who also went to court against the tax authorities. We supported him, and 
then made him a city councilman, and then deputy mayor. We haven’t made 
him mayor yet. He’s not quite ready. But we will do it. Essentially, we are his 
election headquarters.
In this and similar cases, it becomes difficult to distinguish between the newspa-
per’s newsroom and the candidate’s campaign headquarters.
There is, as yet, nothing other than healthy scepticism to suggest that this sort 
of relationship, should the newspapers’ favoured candidate win, might lead to a 
loss of independence for either of these newspaper. To the contrary, the editors 
say they will turn on their current political friends should those politicians not live 
up to expectations. And, despite these misgivings, the activist model might seem 
more favourable than the paternalistic model. At the very least, the activist model 
places the newspaper squarely within society – a fact that is evidently perceived 
by readers and rewarded with higher circulations. There is, however, the illustra-
tive case of another transition, this time from the activist to the profiteer model, 
the pitfalls of which are explored in the next section.
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Profiteer Newspapers
Profiteer newspapers arise out of a wide variety of circumstances, sometimes 
intentionally, other times not. What separates them clearly from the two prior 
categories is that they are managed specifically for the purpose of making mon-
ey; what separates them from other profit-oriented media businesses is that their 
profit strategy extends beyond the classical model of selling advertisements and 
circulation.
A typical example is FEFD2, a twice-weekly newspaper in a large city in the 
Far East Federal District.9 In its early years, it was squarely in the activist model, 
known as one of the most crusading newspapers in the region. Among its reporters 
was Grigorii Pasko, who uncovered environmental abuses by the Russian navy 
and was tried for espionage as a result. As with the activist newspapers described 
above, some of FEFD2’s reporters got directly involved in politics, serving as 
campaign advisers for the candidates they favoured. Initially independent of any 
of the local political or business groups, the newspaper picked the losing side in a 
mayoral race, and its owners – rather than risk retaliation in a notoriously violent 
city – quickly sold the business and left town. In the words of one reporter, ‘We 
have lost our freedom of speech’.
The new owners – a pair of twenty-something entrepreneurs who made their 
money selling billboard advertising – took over the business with a clear strategy. 
The twenty-three-year-old part-owner said:
We bought the business in order to make money. I invested my own personal 
money back in 2001. Times were good then. But times have changed. We 
used to have a good relationship with the authorities, but the authorities have 
changed, and our relationship has changed. The authorities aren’t interested 
in giving anymore, only taking. Now, we’re trying to be neutral. If we put 
ourselves in opposition, they’ll shut us down quite quickly. [. . .] A newspaper 
is always a political instrument. Beyond the regional and city administra-
tions, there is the city duma, the regional assembly. They need to promote 
themselves, right? We just need to be faster at reacting to these potential 
clients than our competitors.
As a result, unlike at the paternalistic and activist newspapers where the figure 
of manager and editor is often one and the same, in profiteer newspapers such 
as FEFD2 the editor is generally strictly subordinated to the manager. The latter, 
in turn, is responsible for generating orders for articles, which are then to be ex-
ecuted by the editor and journalists. At FEFD2, where this control is particularly 
strict, all major news stories are filtered through the manager prior to publication, 
not so much to avoid controversy as to identify opportunities for profit.
Another example is FEFD6, a weekly newspaper in a small Siberian city. In 
this case, the newspaper was started in the paternalistic mould.10 The owner said 
that the other newspapers there ‘are faceless and toothless. [Our newspaper] was 
the only one that was able to be oppositional, and people turned to us for that. 
People looked for us. But that ended. Advertising took over. That’s life.’
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Gradually, the newspaper’s advertising staff became better and better at selling 
advertising, and, given the newspaper’s relative popularity, advertisers were look-
ing to buy. Advertising literally did take over, to the point where, by mid-2004, 
it covered the entirety of the front page and left only two full pages (out of a 
minimum of twenty-four) for news. Again, the owner said: ‘I don’t know how it 
happened. It just did.’
At FEFD7, another profiteering weekly in a remote Far Eastern city, a young 
trainee employee displayed the same functional confusion that the reporters/po-
litical consultants did at FEFD2. Having trained both in the newsroom and the 
advertising department, she was asked whether she wanted to work in advertising 
or journalism. Her response: ‘Actually, I’d like to work in both. I think it’s an 
interesting challenge, to figure out what an advertiser needs, and then help them 
achieve that on the news pages’.11 Her editor smiled approvingly.
Not all profiteering need be so overtly pernicious. At FEFD5, a weekly in the 
same large Far Eastern city as FEFD2, the editorial staff are allowed a fair amount 
of independence, and the newspaper is one of the best and most successful in the 
city. In this case, the profits sought by the owner and founder were not financial:
I was forced to open the paper. In 1996, I needed it as a life raft. I used to be 
involved in trading, and I was having problems with the authorities. I needed 
the newspaper to defend myself. Later, I liked having my finger on the pulse 
of information. We are able to influence events, and we don’t want to be like 
everyone else.12
For all of these profiteering newspapers, readers are at best a commodity, and 
at worst a nuisance. Where profit is derived from rampant advertising, readers 
are needed to gain a competitive advantage; this is the most akin to the standard 
western newspaper model, with the key difference lying in the fact that these 
newspapers reach a scale of advertising that crowds out news. Where profit is 
derived from politics and influence, readers are less important; what matters is the 
ability of the newspaper to drop a piece of information according to a client’s paid 
instructions into the broader media space, where it could be picked up by televi-
sion. In none of these cases, however, is mediated communication a significant 
part of the model; the newspaper is thus deprived even of the first of the two 
meanings described earlier – the message.
Conclusions: the defensive reflex and the failure to 
communicate
At the lowest ebb of the samizdat phenomenon in the Soviet Union, when repres-
sion was driving the medium further and further underground, a new phenomenon 
began to arise. Natal’ia Sadomskaia recounts the story of an event that happened 
after her partner, Boris Shragin, wrote and published in samizdat a letter in defence 
of Aleksandr Ginzburg, to which he attached his address. Sadomskaia recalls:
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And one morning, at about six or seven o’clock, there was a ring at the door. 
We were quite frightened, because Boris had already been kicked out of the 
Party and fired from work, and we were really expecting him to be arrested. 
I opened the door on the chain and asked, ‘Who’s there?’ The main asked 
for Boris Shragin. ‘On what business?’ I asked. . . . ‘On urgent business.’ I 
opened the door and saw a man in glasses carrying a briefcase. And he didn’t 
come in . . . saying, ‘You understand, I want Boris Shragin to write about 
the horrors at the Lenin Library.’ ‘What horrors?’ I asked. He replied: ‘The 
cafeteria is very bad. They’re stealing, and it’s impossible to eat what they 
serve.’ (Sadomskaia 2003)
Remarkably similar stories are told by the staff of many of the newspapers 
referred to above. Thus, a reporter at FEFD3 said: ‘The city government reads us 
carefully. The elevator in my building was fixed after I complained about it.’ The 
editor of SFD1 sums up the phenomenon as follows: ‘Our reader is used to seeing 
this newspaper as his last line of defence. We are forced to play that role, and, to 
be honest, we want to play this role.’
On the one hand, this would seem to speak to a relationship between newspa-
per and reader that is almost quaint. It also reflects back on old Soviet practices, 
when readers would frequently write with run-of-the-mill household complaints 
to their favourite newspapers. However, when de Tocqueville speaks of ‘dropping 
the same thought into the thousand minds’, or when Hume writes of ‘conveying 
the alarm from one end of the kingdom to the other’, they were not referring 
to broken elevators and unpalatable cafeteria food. They were, rather, referring 
to what I have already called a true media space, in which each participant is 
extended and interconnected, giving messages greater resonance. The message of 
a faulty elevator may well be carried by the newspaper to the relevant authorities, 
but that is not the desired effect. The fact that a newspaper might take pride in 
serving such a role only underscores the profound silence that follows the drop-
ping of these messages into the broader Russian media space. It is a silence that 
all of these newspapers seem powerless to overcome.
Samizdat did not bring down the Soviet Union, but it did transform it. Among 
its most avid readers were not just dissidents, but also members of the nomen-
klatura elite, and the counterpoint that it provided to the official line hastened 
the bankruptcy of Bolshevik ideology. It was able to do this in part because it 
extended the proverbial Russian ‘kitchen table’, that special place in which con-
versation is always open and honest. Samizdat, in effect, put everyone around the 
same kitchen table, passing the same thoughts on onion-skin paper from one end 
of the country to the other. Samizdat’s technological unification of the reader and 
publisher created a natural solidarity of purpose, which is broken in newspapers 
today.
When given the opportunity, writers still write what they want to read (as well 
as what they want to write). In the profiteer model, that opportunity is all but 
lost. In the activist model, that opportunity is co-opted by the media producers, 
who too closely equate their preferences with those of their readers and pursue 
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non-media agendas that may come back to haunt them. And in the paternalistic 
model, almost the opposite is true, as media producers become increasingly di-
vorced from a readership with which they do not, in any case, identify. Moreover, 
in all of these models political communication is systematically marginalised or 
eliminated altogether. Thus, the loss of the direct relationship between publisher 
and reader has not been replaced by any viable mechanism of transmitting read-
ers’ preferences – and, more importantly, political perceptions – to writers, which 
would overcome the considerable barriers described above. It is the task of an-
other piece of research to determine how such a mechanism may be created. What 
seems clear, however, is that even the freest of the Russian media are catastrophi-
cally failing to communicate.
Notes
 1 Russian Independent Print Media Program Annual Report Fy-2005. Moscow, New 
Eurasia Foundation, 2005.
 2 All interviews and other information gathering on SFD1 were conducted during a site 
visit on 10–11 November 2004.
 3 All interviews and information gathering on FEFD1 were conducted during a site 
visit on 31 January–1 February 2005.
 4 Interviews on CFD2 were conducted in Moscow on 21–3 December 2004.
 5 Interviews on VFD2 were conducted in Moscow on 21–3 December 2004.
 6 Interviews and observations on UFD1 were conducted in Moscow on 21–3 December 
2004.
 7 Interviews and other information gathering for FEFD3 were conducted during a site 
visit on 27–8 January 2005.
 8 Interviews and other information gathering for FEFD4 were conducted during a site 
visit on 29 January 2005.
 9 Interviews and other information gathering for FEFD2 were conducted during a site 
visit on 24–5 January 2005.
 10 Interviews and other information gathering on FEFD6 were conducted during a site 
visit on 2–3 February 2005.
 11 Interviews and other information gathering on FEFD7 were conducted during a site 
visit on 4 February 2005.
 12 Interviews and other information gathering on FEFD5 were conducted during a site 
visit on 26 January 2005.
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